

**IV.**

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**THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATIONS  
OF THE DOUBLE SYLLOGISM**



## THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATIONS OF THE DOUBLE SYLLOGISM

**0. The term *double syllogism*** appeared in scientific research in the early 90's to denote a semantic-pragmatic construction as part of text meaning analysis, first in Hungarian (BÉKÉSI 1991a, 1991b), then in German (BÉKÉSI 1994). Two authors have directly discussed *double syllogism* in their logical systematizing papers: AVI SION (Sion 1990/1996), and JONATHAN DOLHENTY (no year specified). Both studies became widely accessible with the Internet gaining popularity.\*

### 0.1. Logical interpretations of *double syllogism*

**0.1.1.** JONATHAN DOLHENTY arrived at a description and application of “double syllogisms” through an analysis of compound syllogisms, which he approached, as a first step, in the course of examining the overt or covert “compound propositions” appearing in syllogisms (ibid., Ch. 4, 1–2). For the purposes of this topic, the analysis of *covertly multiple syllogisms* is particularly relevant; among them, especially the propositions called *exclusive*, containing an exclusive lexeme like „only”, „just”, „exclusively”, or „alone”. Such exclusive lexemes represent covert propositions, thereby adding one extra proposition:

First proposition:

***Only*** the evil are rich.

Second proposition:

*Those who are not evil are not rich.*

DOLHENTY suggests that the second proposition is the tool, rather than the result, of the argument. He considers *double syllogism* as a compound logical figure used, among other things, to confirm the proposition building role of *exclusive* lexemes: that is, to confirm the existence of a covert second proposition complementing the explicit proposition. The easiest way to follow DOLHENTY's concept is by applying a syllogism with both its premises containing the exclusive „exclusively” lexeme.

***Exclusively*** the rich are happy.

***Exclusively*** the evil are rich.

Therefore, ***exclusively*** the evil are happy.

According to the author, „Both premises contain two covert propositions” (ibid. Ch. 4, 5–7). The major premise is composed of the following two propositions:

*The rich are happy* **and**

*Everyone who is not rich is not happy.*

The minor premise contains the following two propositions:

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\* Study no. 1 will be published for the first time here, Studies no. 3 and 4 appeared in the 2003 and 2004 issues of “Sprachtheorie und germanistisches Linguistik”, respectively.

*The evil are rich* **and**  
*Everyone who is not evil is not happy.*

„Both arguments are valid” – states DOLHENTY. Consequently, we can combine the conclusion of the first syllogism (*The evil are rich*) with the conclusion of the second syllogism (*Everyone who is not evil is not happy*).

In this way, the formula of double syllogism acquires a confirming role, whereby both the first and the second syllogism follow the first figure of syllogisms (M–P, S–M, S–P), with the major premises all being universal, and the minor ones – assertive:

First syllogism:			Second syllogism:
M – P	<i>The rich are happy,</i>	<b>and</b>	<i>Everyone who is not rich is not happy.</i>
S – M	<i>The evil are rich</i>	<b>and</b>	<i>Everyone who is not evil is not rich.</i>
S – P	<i>The evil are happy,</i>	<b>and</b>	<i>Everyone who is not evil is not happy.</i>

By combining the conclusion of the first and the second syllogism (S – P **and** S – P), one can create the single exclusive proposition: „*Exclusively the evil are happy*”.

**0.1.2.** AVI SION published the first version of his study bearing a promising title (*Future Logic*) in 1990, and re-worked it in 1996; this latter version is available on the Internet (SION,1996). The author discusses *double syllogism* in the summarizing Chapter 52. Here, he focuses on the *elementary* and *compound* character of propositions contained in various types of operations. Of these, we are interested in the *compound* character of propositions. Here both *quantity or extensional* and – through a concessive relation in the second syllogism – deontic modality play a role:

First syllogism:			Second syllogism:
All M are P,	<b>and</b>		all P must be M,
Some S are M,	<b>though</b>		these S can not-be M,
So Some S are P,	<b>though</b>		these S can not-be P.

It is not by accident that the first and second syllogism constitute a whole identified as *double syllogism* in the present case. Actually, they represent, in the first place, the most immediate constituents of a paradigm consisting of four figures, well-known in logic. Here we have the terms of the two major premises arranged in reverse order (M – P, and P – M); the order of the minor premises and also that of the conclusions are identical (S – M, S – P).

In SION’s interpretation, terms related with the conjunctions *and* and *though* represent parts constituting a mixed modality system. That provides the framework in which a logical analysis of the compound propositions takes place in the same medium of examination as the semantic-pragmatic research outlined below. However, it goes without saying that this latter relies on a “practical”, rather than formal, concept of syllogism, similarly, using Shakespeare’s well-known example, to LAUSBERG:

„*Well, think of marriage now (= propositio): younger than you, / here in*

Verona,... / are made already mothers (= premissa maior)... / I was your mother much upon these years / that you are now a maid (= premissa minor). Thus then in brief (= conclusio-Formel): the valiant Paris seeks you for his love (conclusio, die inhaltlich nur eine konkrete ratio der propositio ist). (RJ 1,3,69: LAUSBERG 1963. p.119)

## 0.2. Double syllogism as a semantic-pragmatic figure

The term *double syllogism* as used here refers to linguistic usage where deductive reasoning may take not one, but two, simultaneous or consecutive paths in the argumentation of natural texts. In its most evident manifestation, the conjunction *but* in the role of denial of expectation models the contradiction between an implicit assertive first element and an explicit subsequent element of negation. Since, however, the two contradictorily related elements are both conclusions, at the same time, of deductive reasoning, the interlocutor may be bale to reconstruct the implicit major or minor premises, providing that he has some knowledge of the state of affairs described. *Double syllogism* is thus an initial structure bearing a semantic-pragmatic character. It has been created to analyze the structure embracing the *but*-relation. It builds on the hypothesis that the conjunction *but* models the contradiction between two syllogistic conclusions, rather than that between two elementary items.

### 0.2.1. Representing double syllogism

Let us signify the terms of the two syllogisms with the symbols (**Apr**), (**Ap**), (**Aq**), and (**Bpr**), (**Bp**), (**Bq**), respectively. (**A**) is the first syllogism, (**B**) stands for the second. (**Apr**) is the major premise of the first syllogism, (**Bpr**) is the major premise of the second syllogism. These meaning components are mostly implicit (as indicated by the asterisk symbol): (**Apr\***), (**Bpr\***). (**Ap**) is the minor premise of the first syllogism, (**Aq**) is the conclusion (concluding term) of the first syllogism. (**Bp**) is the minor premise of the second syllogism, (**Bq**) is the conclusion (concluding term) of the second syllogism. The major premise is the linguistic formulation of the conceived/known, etc. general experience about the piece of reality represented in the utterance, occasionally containing a *pragmatic presupposition*.

Here is an example:

*Gyerekkoromban  
boldog lehettem volna,  
de nem értettem hozzá.*

[Lit.]

*In my childhood,  
I could have been happy  
But I did not know how to do that.*

*Felnőttkoromban  
boldog lehettem volna,  
de nem értem rá.*

*In my adulthood,  
I could have been happy  
But I did not have the time.*

*Öregkoromban  
boldog lehetnék,  
de a közelgő halál okozná.  
(Weöres Sándor: De)*

*In my old age,  
I could be happy  
But that would be due to oncoming death.  
(Sándor Weöres: But)*

The contradiction of the direct relation on the surface structure of the rhyme cited above holds between the two – explicit and implicit – conclusions:

(Aq) *I could have been happy* but (Bq\*) I wasn't,

(Aq) *I could have been happy* but (Bq\*) I wasn't,

(Aq) *I could be happy* but (Bq\*) I can't.

It follows from the above relations that the explicit contradictory closing sentence of each verse appears as a **(Bp)**, i.e., a minor premise: ..., *but* I was not happy because.....

(Aq) *I could have been happy* but (Bp) *I did not know how to do that.*

(Aq) *I could have been happy* but (Bp) *I did not have the time.*

(Aq) *I could be happy* but (Bq\*) *that would be due to oncoming death.*

## 1. An Empirical Study of the Set Expression

..., but it does not follow from this that...

The below analysis is an attempt at describing one of the forms of manifestation of the semantic-pragmatic construct named „double syllogism” (Békési 1994, 2003, 2004). Double syllogism, heretofore basically interpreted on a theoretical level and through logical parallels of linguistic constructs, emerges here in the form of a set expression. Although the empirical study concentrates on examples taken from Hungarian, the semantic-pragmatic relationship viewed from the point of view of double syllogism manifests itself in English in the form of more or less set expressions.

### 1.1. Sentence vs. Proposition

Text is composed of segments whose sentences and blocks sentences have the value of an utterance. The proposition with a value entails – especially in argumentative texts – (among other things) frequent association with each other through reason and cause / cause and reason relations. In one group, the speaker often leaves it to the interlocutor to identify and assess such relations, without applying connective linguistic elements to denote the relation between such utterances.

In another group of such reason and cause / cause and reason relations, the means used would be explicit. Furthermore, some of these means (those derived from adverbs) even have a referential meaning, cf. *emiatt* [therefore], *(ebből) következően* [as a result (of that)], *következésképp(en)* [consequently], etc. In this latter group, special mention should be made in this context of the set expression „..., *de ebből még nem következik, hogy...*” [but it does not follow from this that...]. Here, the utterance appearing as the second part of the *but*-relation plays two different roles, at least from a logical point of view. The utterance is partly a conclusion of a syllogical inference, and it takes modal precedence over the base of inference of the antecedent, in other words, the modality of the set of the minor premise and major premise of the antecedent.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> It should be noted here that ‘modality’, in general, involves the way in which the speaker creates the model of the interrelation between the subject and the predicate of an utterance, on the basis of a fact, a possibility, or necessity. The tools used to create the model are predominantly linguistic, i.e., lexical and morphological in nature. Alongside these tools, modality is created with the help of a pragmatic-semantic construct, namely, double syllogism, taking the form of a set expression like „..., *de ebből még nem következik, hogy...*”.

There is no need here for a detailed presentation of the syllogistic character of inferences. The set expression „..., *de ebből még nem következik, hogy...*” underlines the caution required when one intends to infer ‘factuality’ of a state of affairs from an antecedent having a ‘possibility’ modality expressed by lexemes like *lehet* [maybe] (or *előfordul* [happens], a *megesik* [occurs], az *olykor* [at times], etc.); or to infer present or future ‘necessity’ on the basis of expressions like „*tény, hogy*” [it is a fact that]; „*igaz, hogy*” [it is true that]; „*érthető, hogy*” [it is understandable that], etc., suggesting factuality.

The examples below are used simply to illustrate the major steps of the argumentation presented here.

## 1.2. Modal Cases of Double Syllogism

1.2.1. The posterior constituent of the *but*-relation is a negative sentence

1.2.1.1. The speaker uses the set expression to warn the interlocutor not to infer factuality from possibility/partiality.

- (1) „*Megesik a legjobb családban is, hogy zabigyerék születik, de ebből még nem következik, hogy minden családban csak zabigyerék születik.*” (Könczöl Csaba: Múlt és Jövő, 1989. 82)

[It happens that a chance child is born even in the best family, but it does not follow from this that only chance children are born in all families.]

- (2) „*A szellemi fejlődést bizonyos korokban haladásnak tekintették, de ebből még nem következik, hogy ez a két gondolat mindenben azonos volna.*” (Thienemann Tivadar: Irodalomtörténeti alapfogalmak, 1930. 23)

[In some periods, intellectual development was seen as making progress, but it does not follow from this that these two thoughts are completely identical.]

- (3) „Elhalad az ember előtt egy áltekintély: talán még megilletődöttséget is kivált, s jókora idő is eltelik sokszor, mire felébred az ember, s kiköp. *Esetleg éppen akkor* teszi ezt, amikor a valódi érkezik meg elé. Mert az élet egy nagy-nagy karnevál, *az egyik kocsin* ugyan papírmáséból van a tüzet okádó brontosaurusz, *de ebből még nem következik, hogy a következőn esetleg nem valódi az őshüllő.*” (Csurka István: Kettes kolbász, 1980. 199)

[... Because life is a greatest carnival, while the brontosaurus spouting fire on one of the carts is made from pasteboard, but it does not follow from this that, possibly, the ancient reptile on the next one will also be unreal.]

1.2.1.2 Something real viewed as being true/acceptable should not be interpreted as a necessity.

- (4) „*De Man, érezve, hogy a szocialistaelmélet kényes pontjához nyúl, nem sajnálja a pedagógus-fáradtságot. Igazat ad a marxizmusnak abban, hogy az eszméknek anyagi előfeltételük van. De ebből még nem következik, hogy maguk nem valóságok, csak tükröződései az egyedül valóságos anyagi viszonyoknak.* Egy dolog attól még nem valótlan, hogy oka van. Valótlan akkor volna csak, ha ő maga nem lehetne más jelenségek okává.” (Németh László: A minőség forradalma 5–6., 1943. 131)

[De Man ... admits that Marxism is right in presuming that ideas depend on material premises. But it does not follow from this that they themselves are not realistic and represent mere reflections of solely realistic material relations. Something is not unreal just because it has a reason for its existence. ...]

- (5) „Aztán itt vannak a szorongásosok, tériszonyosok, hipochonderek, kényszeresek, neuraszténias hisztériások... Néha csak egyetlen furcsa alaptünettel, amire ráépül a bonyolult kórkép, a közös alaptünet az életképtelenség. Gyenge a létért folytatott küzdelemhez, ez a lényeg. *Hogy ez is gyakran összefonódik szexuális zavarral, az érthető, de ebből még nem mernék arra következtetni, hogy a szexuális*



zavar okozza az életképtelenséget.” (Benedek István: Aranyketrec. Egy elmeosztály élete, 1957. 371)  
 [... Struggle for life is weak, that is the point. *It is understandable that this, too, is often combined with sexual disorder, but I would not dare to infer from this that sexual disorder causes inviability.*]

### 1.3. The posterior constituent of the but-relation is an affirmative sentence

The argumentation used before is reinforced by reversal of the direction of inference. Here, the contrastive posterior constituent represents an affirmative, rather than a negative utterance: „*A fenti elemzésből [nem kéne következnie], mégis az következik, hogy...*” [*The above analysis [would not entail, it] nevertheless entails that ...*]

- (6) „*A morális jogok fogalma **nincs hozzákötve** a természetjoghoz, hiszen a [fent] mondottak nem feltételezik, hogy az igazolt morális jogok a társadalomban élő emberek szabályalkotó, szabályalkalmazó és szabályfenntartó tevékenységén s a szabályokról folytatott társadalmi vitán kívül léteznének. (...) A fenti elemzésből **mégis az következik, hogy** az igazolt morális jogok rendelkeznek a természetes jogok egy sor fontos tulajdonságával, ami lehetővé teszi, hogy a kodifikált jogok, a kodifikált törvény mércéjeként használjuk őket.*” (Kis János: Beszélő, 1986. 395)  
 [*The notion of moral rights is **not bound** to the law of kind ... **Nevertheless it follows** from the above analysis that justified moral rights are bound to the law of kind...*]

Readers of the above argumentation are put in the picture through the **mégis az következik, hogy** [**nevertheless it follows**] segment, however, the implicit constituents of the relation are made more transparent by applying the structure of double syllogism.

1.3.1. If the posterior constituent of the argumentation (*A fenti elemzésből mégis az következik, hogy...* [**Nevertheless it follows from the above analysis that** ]) is the conclusion of its own inference (contained in the posterior constituent), then the contrastive **mégis** [**nevertheless**] „triggers” an immediate contrastive relation with the conclusion of the first inference. (Legend. (Aq\*) = implicit conclusion of the antecedent, (Bq) = explicit conclusion of the posterior constituent.)

(Aq\*) nem kéne tehát annak következnie, hogy..., **mégis** (Bq) *az következik, hogy...*  
 [(Aq\*) would, thus, not entail that ..., **nevertheless** (Bq) *it follows that...*]

1.3.2. Implicit presence of the conclusion represented by the (Aq\*) symbol is confirmed, in addition to the conjunction **mégis** [**nevertheless**], also related to it by the contrastive (Bq), but the explicit minor premise of the first inference, i.e., (Ap), and the major premise (typically implicit) that is concomitant with the minor premise, i.e., (Apr\*) as well.

(Ap) *A morális jogok fogalma **nincs hozzákötve** a természetjoghoz,...*  
 [(Ap) *The notion of moral rights is **not bound** to the law of kind ...*]

The predominant constituent of the initial structure applied here is the "deep structure" conjunction as interpreted by JÁNOS S. PETŐFI and denoted by ET (Petőfi 1991). In this case, ET validates the statement which is axiomatic in logic and according to which no minor premise is possible without a major one; as regards semantics and pragmatics, it validates the statement according to which generation of a description of a state of affairs depends upon the presence of general/collective experience, knowledge, etc. related to it. The issue of whether facts can be viewed as 'reality' is one of the most important issues in arts philosophy.

(Apr\*) If two notions are not „bound to each other”, then one cannot expect availability of one notion to lead to the availability of the other notion.

#### 1.4. Linear architecture of double syllogistic inferences

In the case at hand, the *de* [but] conjunction representing the major contrastive relation, followed by the set expression *ebből nem következik* [it does not follow that] and their order also specify the order of the remaining constituents. The implicit conclusion (Aq\*) of the antecedent appears on the same level as the explicit conclusion (Bq) of the posterior constituent, immediately preceding the *de* [but] conjunction. The statement begins with the explicit minor premise representing the basis of the inference, and the implicit major premise is attached to it by way of deep structure ET conjunction.

The explicit conclusion of the posterior constituent may have, as a reason for its existence, its own basis of the inference, as illustrated in (4). (*De ebből még nem következik, hogy maguk nem valóságok, csak tükröződései az egyedül valóságos anyagi viszonyoknak. Egy dolog [ugyanis] attól még nem valótlan, hogy oka van. [But it does not follow from this that they themselves are not realistic and represent mere reflections of solely realistic material relations. Something is [after all] not unreal just because it has a reason for its existence. ...]*). The role of conclusion is, however, determined by its own fixed place and also certainty, a higher level of modality expressed in it.

#### 1.5. Denial of expectation and contrast as differences in scope

The use of the set expression analysed here has been illustrated through examples in which the posterior constituent of the contrastive relation is modelled with the conjunction *de* [but]. The choice is evident: the conjunction *de* [but] is used for denial of expectation, that is, denial of some expectation that has the role of a conclusion (Lakoff 1971). This, however, does not preclude the use of the contrastive *azonban* [however] for denying some expectation.

Speakers of the above examples could have conveyed the contrastive role of the adversative relation by using the conjunction *however* positioned after the DP contrasted, similarly, for example, to (4):


(4) (Ebből **viszont** még nem következik, hogy...)

It is interesting to note that the contrastive relation in an English example quoted in 1973 models the contrastive relation also by the conjunction denying expectation, cf.:

(6) Mary is beautiful *but* dumb, *but* Helen is perfect. (Stockwell–Schachter–Partee 1973. 396). In Hungarian, the second opposition is contrastive, rather than one denying expectation, thereby breaking down sentential meaning more adequately:

Mária szép, *de* buta, Ilona **viszont** tökéletes. / *Mary is beautiful but dumb, Helen, on the other hand, is perfect.*

The meanings of the sentences may be broken down in a straightforward manner by applying a tree structure representation.



The train of thought dealing with the syllogistic role of the two predicates (*beautiful, dumb*) would take this issue as a starting point. I have presented a number of analyses on this topic, therefore, in conclusion, I will point out the basic consideration relevant for the issue at hand. Both predicates function here as minor premises. Their contrast is modelled by the conjunction *but* only indirectly. The contrastive relation directly holds between the implicit, linguistically latent affirmative and negative conclusions.

**1.6.** The set expression presented above in the analyses of the examples offers a way to explain a number of further observations, a part of which will be pointed out in Volume 19 of *Szemiotikai szövegtan / Semiotic Textology*. The general lesson we learn from them is that syllogistic relations must not be ignored, especially in the course of analysis of texts having an argumentative character.

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## 2. The Place of Concession in Contrastive Structures

**Abstract.** The author assumes that concession is a form used to express denial of expectation. That assumption allows him to formulate the hypothesis that the various functions involved in concession are interpreted by positions occupied by concession within a contrastive structure. The study argues that concession plays a role in two positions in a contrastive structure. (1) Between the precedent and the antecedent (as the main relation in a contrastive structure), and (2) as a subordinate relation embedded in the conclusion (inside either the precedent or the antecedent). Since a contrast represents a semantic-pragmatic relation here, the study considers concession also as a semantic-pragmatic phenomenon. The author has elaborated a notational mechanism to assist description, presented under the term *double syllogism* (Békési 1991, 1994). According to the mechanism, the conjunction *de [but]* is used to express, or establish, a relation between two syllogistic arguments, rather than two clauses.

The train of thought presented below is based on some major elements in JÁNOS S. PETŐFI's TeSWeST theory (PETŐFI 1975, 1991). Accordingly, causal relations (*tehát [thus]*, *hiszen [~as]*) participating in the environment of the structure created by a *de [but]*-relation are considered here as parts of implication operations. In this way, we are able to assign general knowledge to an utterance relating to a specific state of affairs. (The 'deep structure' connection between these two implications, i.e., the specific and the general implication, is marked by the ET symbol.)

The propositional stratification of a canonical meaning structure, that is, hierarchic integration of performative-modal, world-creating, and descriptive propositional levels, is also derived from JÁNOS S. PETŐFI's theory (PETŐFI 1996a, 270–275). Furthermore, a great number of considerations presented here are based on TeSWeST. Without them, and also without the numerous pieces of advice kindly provided by JÁNOS S. PETŐFI, the train of thought presented below could not have been formulated, or, at any rate, it would have been much less complete and coherent.

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
Concession plays a role in a contrastive relation in two places: between the antecedent and the succedent (representing the main relation of a contrastive structure), and embedded in the 'conclusion' (as a subrelation inside the antecedent or the succedent).

### 2.1. Concessive relation as a main relation

Here, the role involves a succedent location; therefore, the structure thus obtained is also referred to as 'concessive relation in post-position'. Concessive relation represents the main relation of the sequential variant of a restrictive contrastive structure (denial of expectations: LAKOFF 1971. 131–142; RUDOLPH 1996.). This is illustrated in (1) and Scheme [I].

(1) *A miniszterek cserélődtek, de a titkárnő megőrizte állását.* [*The ministers shifted about, but the secretary kept her job.*] (DORFMÜLLER-KARPUSA 1982. 100–110)

un[I]



Scheme [I] allows one to formulate a number of conclusions; at least one of them, the semantic-pragmatic conditions and syntactic consequences of a sequential change, should already be pointed out.

2.1.1. Apparently, (2) contains a **semantic** condition. Here, the two 'world-creating' propositions (*assume, know*) can follow each other linearly only in accordance with their place occupied within the system. Thus, the conjunction *pedig* [*although*] could not replace *de* [*but*] in a *tudja, de feltételezi* [*knows but assumes*] arrangement; the conjunction *de* could not play a role in a linear arrangement resulting from *feltételezi, pedig tudja* [*assumes although knows*]. (Here we leave aside the variants obtained by applying negation.)

(2) „<sup>1</sup>*Az ember a végzettel szemközt mindig lapító állásfoglalásban él: <sup>2</sup>tudja, hogy van, <sup>3</sup>feltételezi, hogy az ő életében és az ő személyére nem érvényes.*” [<sup>1</sup>*Man always lives with a hidden assumption toward destiny: <sup>2</sup>he knows that it exists but <sup>3</sup>assumes that it is not valid in his life and for him as a person.*] (Márai 2001. 136)

The linear row of syntactic (surface) description clearly shows that the 'restrictive' *de* [*but*] conjunction turned into a concessive *pedig* [*although*] as a result of the change of order of propositions *tudja* [*knows*] and *feltételezi* [*assumes*]; (at the same time, it is also apparent that the type of concession thus obtained will preserve its level, i.e., it represents a 'coordinative' relation).


(LegendE: F<sup>1</sup>, F<sup>2</sup>, F<sup>3</sup> = first, second, third main clause block; (t) = objectival clause; slash indicates subordination asterisk is used to denote an implicit component.)

$((F^1) \text{ innuendo}^* ((F^2 /_{\text{that}} (t)),$	$\text{but}$	$(F^3 /_{\text{that}} (t)))$
$((F^1) \text{ innuendo}^* ((F^3 /_{\text{that}} (t))$	$\text{although}$	$(F^2 /_{\text{that}} (t)))$

We can make the implicit 'conclusions' of the two propositions, each fulfilling the roles a 'minor premise', visible in the semantic description under [IIa] and [IIb]. They appear to move together with their 'minor premises' in the course of change of order.


[IIa]

„*Man knows that destiny exists, ...*”



[IIb]

„[Man] *assumes that* [destiny] *is not valid in his life and for him as a person.*”




[IIa] and [IIb] allow us to draw a simplified scheme of the two — ‘restrictive’ and ‘concessive’ — contrastive structures whose order can be changed.

Simplified scheme of restrictive contrast

„*Man knows that* [destiny] *exists, but he assumes that ...* [thus he does not acknowledge it].”

[IIIa]






### Simplified scheme of concessive contrast

„*Man assumes that [destiny] ... is not valid in his life although he knows it exists... [thus] he should acknowledge it.*”

„*Az ember feltételezi, hogy [a végzet] az ő életében ... nem érvényes, pedig tudja, hogy van, [tehát] tudomásul kellene vennie.*” [*Man assumes that [destiny] ... is not valid in his life although he knows it exists... [thus] he should acknowledge it.*]

[IIIb]



It can be seen from Schemes [IIIa] and [IIIb] that concessive contrast modifies the meaning structure of restrictive contrast through one modal item, viz., conditional mood. Conditional mood involves a negative 'conclusion' of the antecedent: „*Man does **not** acknowledge [destiny], although he **should** acknowledge it.*”

**2.1.2.** The next example marked (3), again, illustrates a **semantic** correlation in which various levels of 'certainty' are distinguished. In the last sentence of (3), the conjunction *de [but]* relates an 'assumable' proposition (*it looks*) to the *biztos [sure]* which is an antecedent. The change of order of these two 'world-creating' propositions prescribe the use of the concessive *pedig [although]* instead of *de [but]*.

(3) „ – Mit csinál a vágánybenéző?

– Jönne egy vonat, a torony leszól, hogy az állomás hanyadik vágányára járatná be, ő odáig nem lát, én odamegyek, és benézek, vagyis megállapítom, hogy üres-e az illető vágány, visszajelzek, és akkor a torony kiadja az engedélyt.

– Nem volna elég egy műszer, amelyik jelezné a vágány foglaltságát?

– **Biztos**, hogy elég volna, **de úgy látszik**, hogy én olcsóbb vagyok.”

[ – What does a track checker do?

– When a train is coming, the tower tells me which of the tracks of the station it would want the train to use, but it cannot see that far, so I go there and check, that is,

*I establish whether the tracks are empty, then I signal and the tower issues the permission.*

– *Wouldn't an instrument signaling busy tracks be enough?*

– **Sure** it would be enough **but it looks like** I am cheaper.” (Moldova 1977. 49)

Swapping the antecedent and the succedent in (3) results in a change from ((Ap) *de* [but] (Bp)) into ((Bp) *pedig* [although] (Ap)):

„– *Nem volna elég egy műszer, amelyik jelezné a vágány foglaltságát?* [*Wouldn't an instrument signaling busy tracks be enough?*]

– **Úgy látszik**, hogy én olcsóbb vagyok, **pedig biztos**, hogy elég volna. [*It looks like I am cheaper although that would surely be enough.*]

The two 'world-creating' propositions in the piece of news cited under (4) are located on two poles of an identical 'world' (somebody *acknowledges* vs. *denies* something). The news is based on the concessive **denied that...**, **although** did **acknowledge** that... structure; similarly to (2) and (3) above, they can be reconstructed as an **acknowledged that... but denied** that ... structure.

(4) „*A nyomozás során a fiatalok tagadták, hogy a milliót ők vitték volna el, bár azt elismerték, hogy kisebb összegeket elcsentek.* [*During investigation, the young people denied that they had taken the million (forints) although they acknowledged that they had stolen smaller amounts.*]” (Délmagyarország, October 5, 1998)

Separation of the antecedent and the succedent in (4) into a subordinating structure according to a similar pattern once again emphasizes the level-preserving, coordinative position of 'post-positional' concession. From a structural point of view, either the *de* [but] or the *bár* [although] conjunction could be replaced with the coordinating *viszont* [however] conjunction that fulfills a 'contrastive' role:

*tagadták, hogy ..., elismerték viszont, hogy ...*

[*they denied that ... however they acknowledged that ...*]

*elismerték, hogy ..., tagadták viszont, hogy ...*

[*they acknowledged that... however they denied that...*]

A relation of contrast established through the *viszont* [however] conjunction would, of course, result in a different interpretation (similarly to different interpretations of contrast expressed using *de* [but] and *bár* [although]). Here, however, we'll focus on the identity of the antecedent and the succedent of a contrastive structure in terms of level, rather than on the difference in interpretations. A more significant issue related to this, i.e., a description of the difference between 'prepositional' and 'postpositional' concession will be discussed in Section 3 of this paper.

## 2.2. Concession as a subrelation of restrictive contrast

Here, concession – as a third syllogism – is embedded in the ‘conclusion’ (represented by the antecedent or the succedent). ‘Conclusion’ – when located in an initial position (either as antecedent or succedent) – allows/calls for reasoning by way of a ‘minor premise’. Reasoning may be affirmative or negative – depending on its logical quality. When it is negative, it creates a ‘concessive’ relation, while an affirmative form results in an interpretative relation. A rough scheme might look like this:

((Aq) *pedig* [although] (Cp)),  
((Aq) *hiszen* [as] (Ap)).


(Legend. (A) = antecedent of a restrictive contrast, (B) = its succedent. (C) denotes steps of concessive syllogistic argumentation embedded in the ‘conclusion’.)

### 2.2.1. Embedding of the negative concessive element

The concessive element may appear embedded in the antecedent of a ((Aq) *de* [but] (Bp)) contrast or the succedent of a ((Ap) *de* [but] (Bq)) structure. First, we’ll take a look at how the concessive element is embedded in the antecedent of a ((Aq) *de* [but] (Bp)) structure.

- (5) „Mondanám, nézzen ki az ablakon, de az alagsorban ez rossz vicc volna. [I would tell him to look out the window but in the basement that would be a bad joke.]”  
(ESTERHÁZY 1994. 64)

[IV]



An important feature of (4) is that the 'specific fact' denoted by (Bp) here justifies the implicit 'denial of expectation', that is, (Bq\*).

### 2.2.2. Propositional layers of meaning structure

The antecedent in Figure [IV] marked by (Aq) allows for the inclusion of a concessive detail, that is embedding of a concessive element. This, however, requires that a semantic constraint is fulfilled; the 'performative-modal' proposition *Mondanám* [*I would tell him*] accepts the concessive 'minor premise' only at its own level of meaning.

The concessive element in (5a) is embedded in the antecedent of the contrastive structure as a 'performative-modal' proposition.

(Legend. Pm = performative-modal proposition, W = world-creating proposition, D = descriptive proposition. Cf. PETŐFI 1996a, 270–275.)

(5a) *Mondanám, nézzen ki az ablakon, pedig nem vagyunk beszélő viszonyban egymással, tehát nem kellene szólnom hozzá.* [*I would tell him to look out the window although we do not speak thus I needn't talk to him*]

**Pm:** *I would tell him*

*to look out the window*

ALTHOUGH

**Pm:** *we do not speak*

THUS

**Pm:** *I needn't talk to him*

AS [BECAUSE]


**Pm:** If people do not speak, they need not talk to each other.

BUT

**W:** *in the basement this would be a bad joke.*


Embedding of the concessive 'minor premise' denoted by (Cp)

[V]



The more detailed Scheme [VI] below also indicates the meaning-creating role of each proposition type in (5a).

[VI]



(Aq) not(Cp) not (Cq\*) (Cpr\*) (Bq\*) (Bpr\*) (Bp)


The concessive element was embedded in the antecedent of the contrastive structure in (5a) fulfilling the role of a performative-modal proposition. In (6), on the other hand, the concessive element can be embedded more readily by way of an *I must admit*-type of ‘world creator’. If that is in fact the case, then the first clause in (6) (*It has occurred to me several times since then*) plays the role of ‘world creator’.

(6) „Azóta többször is megfordult a fejemben, hogy oda kellene adnom az üveg francia pezsgőt az intézet volt igazgatójának, de már nyugdíjban van, a lakása pedig valahogy mindig kiesik az utamból. [*It has occurred to me several times since then that I should give the bottle of French champagne to the ex-director of the institute, but he has retired and somehow his flat is out of the way.*]” (Moldova, 1985. 439)

W: ***It has occurred to me several times since then***  
*that I should give the bottle of French champagne to the ex-director of the institute,*  
 ALTHOUGH  
 W: **[I must admit]** I, too, like French champagne,  
 THUS

**W:**        **I should not think about** giving a present  
               BUT  
**DE:**       [the ex-dirtector] *has already retired*.

Embedding of the concessive 'minor premise' denoted by (Cp)



I, too, like  
 French  
 champagne.

### 2.2.3. The affirmative-reasoning 'minor premise'

Apart from the above two conditions for concession embedding (i.e., the antecedent is required to fulfill the role of 'conclusion' and the propositional role of the concessive element should be identical to the propositional role of 'conclusion'), there exists a third prerequisite. It consists in preclusion of an explicit justification for the antecedent fulfilling the role of 'conclusion'. Justification, that is, ((Aq) as (Ap)), fills the place where concession — which also plays the role of justification — could be embedded in the antecedent. This is illustrated in (7).

(7) „*Lett volna [Károlyi úr számára] a lakásomban is egy szoba, mióta szegény feleségem meghalt, egyedül élek, de azt hiszem, Károlyi úr nem akar embereket látni maga körül.* [There would have been a room in my flat [for Mr. Károlyi, too] since my poor wife died, I have lived on my own, but I think Mr. Károlyi does not want to see people around him.]” (Moldova, 1978. p. 394)

(7) does not merely illustrate a formal obstacle. One can also recognize how close the ((Ap) as (Ap)) relation is. A 'conclusion' cannot be supplied with an affirmative/reasoning and an opposite, negative/concessive justification at the same time. The 'minor premise' may be represented either by an affirmative explanation or its opposite (concessive explanation).

Affirmative justification:

(Aq): *There would have been a room in my flat I* [for Mr. Károlyi, too]

AS

(Ap): *since my poor wife died, I have lived on my own*

Negative justification:

(Aq): *There would have been a room in my flat as well* [for Mr. Károlyi]


ALTHOUGH

(Cp): I and my wife live in my flat in a rather small way.

The fact that concession is embedded in a justification role, that is, as a (Cp) similarly to affirmative justification, is also underlined by its internal separation. 'As' in Scheme [VIII] establishes a relation directly between (Aq) and (Apr\*), while 'although' in Scheme [IX] plays a similar role between (Aq) and (Cp).


An important conclusion drawn from this difference is that the affirmative 'minor premise' belongs to the same justification as the 'conclusion', in other words, both elements correspond to antecedents (A) of the contrastive structure ((Aq) as (Ap)).

[VIII]



The element with having negative, concessive quality is the 'minor premise' of an embedded stand-alone argument, therefore it is marked by (C), that is, (Cp), rather than (Ap) or (Bp) [because (B) represents the succedent of a contrastive structure]:


[IX]



**2.2.4.** Concessive syllogism may be embedded in the conclusion of both the antecedent and the succedent. They have the following structure.

2.2.4.1. Concession embedded in an antecedent ‘conclusion’


[X]





#### 2.2.4.2. Concession embedded in a succedent ‘conclusion’

[XI]



### 2.3. Concession in ‘preposition’

The structural roles fulfilled by the concession discussed under **1** and **2** (appearing in ‘postposition’ in both cases) are different: one represents the main relation of the contrastive structure while the other is its sub-relation; they have one feature in common: both are components of a contrastive structure that constitutes a complete utterance. Completeness of the structure derives here from a situation where it is part of a ‘monologue’, representing a relatively self-contained element. Its relational structure is contextual, rather than intertextual.

**2.3.1.** Concession in ‘preposition’ is embedded in an intertextual set of relations. This is indicated by the concessive conjunction. Without *ugyan* [*albeit*], (8a) would be a stand-alone utterance independent of its intertext, expressing ‘restrictive’ contrast. Here, however, it makes the reader recall implicit precedents: *The woman was beautiful*.

(8a) *Albeit the woman was beautiful, she appeared conceited very much, therefore she made an antipathic impression.* (RÁCZ 1968. 264–266; PETŐFI 1996a 267–269)

When contrastive structure is created in a dialog of two interlocutors through transparent embedding, then ‘conclusion’ can start the dialog in the form of a consequence in preposition.

(Legend. A and B are the two interlocutors.)

(8b)

A: *The woman made an antipahtic impression on us.*

B: *But she was beautiful!*

A: *Albeit the woman was beautiful, she appeared conceited very much.*

The concession created with the help of the frequently met pair of conjunctions *Ha ... is* [lit. *If ... too; Even though/if...; However...*] is also based on implicit concession.

(9)

A: – Féltél. [You were afraid.]

B: – „**Ha** féltél **is**, a helyemet megálltam.[**Even if** I was afraid I coped with the situation.] ”

(József Attila: Kész a leltár)

(10)

A: – Nem születtem magyarnak. You were not born a Hungarian

B: – „**Ha** nem születtem volna **is** magyarnak,  
E néphez állanék ezennel én.”

**Even if** I had not been born a Hungarian now I would stand by this people


(Petőfi Sándor: Élet vagy halál)

(A philological note. The conditional past form of the first line of the citation „evokes” the implicit precedents. Does the poet refer to his „non-Hungarian” origin explicitly anywhere in the poem?)

**2.3.2.** The intertextual relations realized in the dialog may be combined into a monolog; then the concessive structure – as an antecedent in a restrictive contrast – appears as a deeply embedded component of a ‘causal’ meaning structure. The succedent conclusion (Bq) of the contrastive structure is the succedent of the causal structure connected through *mert* [because]. This is a typical incidence of prepositional consequence.

(8c) *A nő gyönyörű volt ugyan, de nagyon beképzelt módon viselkedett.*[*Albeit the woman was beautiful, she appeared conceited very much*].

[XII]



This time, the concessive antecedent (Ap) of the contrastive structure builds not only in a cataphoric, forward direction, but also an anaphoric direction, that is, its precedent. Knowledge of the above allows one to specify the difference between the two types contrast that appear structurally identical, i.e., restrictive and (prepositional) concessive contrast.

### 2.3.3. 'Postpositional' contrast and 'restrictive' contrast

**3.3.1.** 'Restrictive' contrast represents a unique type of contrast. The scheme of their explicit constituents is ((Ap) *de* [*but*] (Bq)). This type of contrast can be embedded (e.g., into a causal construction) or expanded (e.g., by a concessive construction), however, neither operation is necessary for its use as a unique type of contrast.

Its explicit succedent (Bq) representing the 'conclusion' is related to the explicit antecedent (Ap) representing the 'minor premise' through the *de* [*but*] conjunction. This relation consists in *de* [*but*] (Bq) deleting the propositional content of (Aq), whether explicit or implicit.

3.3.3.2. 'Postpositional' concession does not affect the propositional content of the antecedent, that is, it brings to the front a contrastive moment inside it. In terms of struc-

ture, this kind of concession is level-preserving (representing a change of order in a 'restrictive' contrast), maintaining a coordinative relation with its antecedent.

**3.3.4. 'Prepositional' concession** represents a stand-alone type of contrast only seemingly. It is doubly embedded; firstly, it is embedded in the antecedent of the restrictive contrast (as the informative 'minor premise' of the antecedent), secondly, as the deeply embedded component of a contrastive succedent in a 'causal' structure. From the point of view of linear arrangement of the utterance, this kind of concession immediately follows the 'conclusion' antecedent of the 'causal' structure; in this sense, it contains the general feature of 'concession' in that the immediate precedent of the concession is the known element of meaning with the role of 'conclusion', as illustrated in (9) through (13).

(9) „A másik oldal már kissé homályosabb. **Mert** menyasszonya volt **ugyan** Vörös Józsefnek az a bizonyos Bárány Etel, **de** ugyanakkor, így beszélük, a saját juhászuk felesége körül ... itt úgy mondják, legyeskedett. [The other line is somewhat unclear. **Because although** /albeit/ that lady called Etel Bárány was József Vörös' bride, **but** at the same time, rumour has it, he was... as they put it around here, butterflying about with their own shepherd's wife]” (Nagy Lajos 1968, 76)

(10) „Szükség is van ily hosszú ismeretségre. **Mert** a falu áttekinthetőbb **ugyan**, mint a város, **de** még mindig elég bonyolult ahhoz, hogy oly bonyolult legyen, mint maga a világ.” [And such long-time familiarity is really needed. **Because although** the village is more transparent than the town, **but** [yet] it is complicated enough to be as complex as the world itself. ] (Nagy Lajos 1968, 423)

(11) „Tán ő [Csontváry] maga sem járt annyira rosszul, mint képzeljük. **Mert ha**, mint mondják, festőből kverulánssá válva, kiábrándultan töltötte **is** élete utolsó évtizedét: a művészi hit, mámor milyen magasait járta meg addig, s művészetben és szerelemben van-e más jutalom, mint az ölelés, nő és műzsáé, akármilyen elhagyatottság követi is.” [Perhaps he /Csontváry/ himself did not come off as badly as we think. **Because even if** he spent the last decade of his life in disappointment — after having turned from a painter into a grievance-monger: he had experienced the peaks of the artist's belief and frenzy up to that time, and is there a greater reward in art and love than a woman's and a muse's embrace, no matter what depth of abandonment follows it. ] (Németh 1975. 381)

The *mert* [because] conjunction representing a causal relation may be omitted.

(12) „A nyelvész dolga nem olyan, mint az orvosé: **ha** megállapít **is** valami hiányt, nem kell rögtön orvossággal szolgálnia. [A linguist's job is not identical to a doctor's job: **even if** he establishes some deficiency, he need not provide a medicine right away.]” (Illyés 1975. II. k. 706)

(13) „Végül a sznobizmusnak is meg kell hökkennie, lassan tán fordulnia is: **bár** a magyar irodalom külföldi terjesztése távolról sem kielégítő, **mégiscsak** kezd kiderülni, hogy az a huszonöt év, amire mi Európától elszakadtunk, nemcsak lemaradást, de világi-

rodalmi értékeket is hozott, amire külföldön is kezdenek ráeszmélni.[Finally, snobism, too, must be taken aback, by and by even turn to the opposite: **although** popularization of Hungarian literature abroad is far from satisfactory, **yet** it is becoming evident that the twenty-five years that separate us from Europe have resulted not only in lagging behind but also in values for the world literature that people abroad are gradually becoming aware of.]” (Németh 1975. 342)

## 2.4. Summary

We have not dealt with a syntactic interpretation of concession, that is, the 'independent' clause of a main clause in this study (BÁNRETI 1983.; KENESEI 1992. 545–549), concession as a type of contrast has been treated as a semantic-pragmatic phenomenon. For this purpose, we resorted primarily to JÁNOS S. PETŐFI's TeSWeST theory, which also offers an opportunity for syntactic interpretation (PETŐFI 1996b.). Hopefully, this aspect will be studied in the near future.

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### 3. A theoretical–empirical analysis of restriction and concession

**Abstract.** Similarly to its predecessor (Békési 2003), this paper is a study of two inter-related types of contrast, restriction and concession. The theoretical part of my paper takes an example from E. Rudolph (Rudolph 1996, 393) as a starting point. By swapping the constituents making up the example, a paradigm with four components is established. This paradigm is then applied to an analysis of two further examples. The first simply serves to confirm the applicability of the paradigm to empirical studies. The second example is used to draw more far-reaching conclusions. Here, contrast appears embedded in a causal structure (first, as a precedent, then as a succedent). The empirical analysis demonstrates that contrast, if embedded, can function only as concession, not as restriction.

#### 3.1. A theoretical analysis of restriction and concession


A comprehensive and systematic account of linguistic research into contrast (in what follows, mainly ‘adversative’ and ‘concessive’ relation) by Elisabeth Rudolph (Rudolph 1996) differentiates between two or three basic methodological orientations. “... there are studies more interested in theoretical questions and others looking for application in natural languages. In recent years one can observe a third group where theoretical results are discussed and confronted with examples of authentic language.

The theoretical interest is concentrated on the attempt to find formal patterns that can be used for abstract descriptions of the meaning of complex sentences. Because of the complicated nature of adversative relations and the impossibility of describing them without taking the concessive relations into consideration there are no convincing patterns of logical simplicity.” (Rudolph 1996. 157)

Although Rudolph has not provided a theoretically elaborate meaning structure, she presented a schema (*an indication mark* for the connection of contrast, p. 31., 245., 316., 386), illustrated in Figure [I] and exemplified in (1).

(1) But I began to learn the Thora, and my brother helped me, *although* he did not see why I, a girl, learned like a boy. [Elkezdtem a Thorát tanulni, és a bátyám *nem értette*, hogy én lányként miért tanulok úgy, mint egy fiú, *de segített benne nekem*.] (Rudolph 1996. 393)

[I/a]




The constituent marked in [I/a] with a thin line represents the implicit proposition contained in (1). This proposition corresponds to a conclusion – possibly formulated under the given circumstances: If someone in a situation characterized by the state of affairs described in (1) *cannot understand* how he could help, then he *will not help*.

Schema [II/a] and example (2) represent the concessive variant of (1). The proposition *my brother did not see why* occupies here a place following the *although* [bár] which marks the main concessive relation.

(2) I began to learn the Thora, and *my brother helped me, although he did not see why* I, a girl, learned like a boy. [Elkezdtem a Thorát tanulni, és *a bátyám ebben segített nekem, bár nem értette*, hogy én leányként miért tanultam úgy, mint egy fiú.]

[II/a]



### 3.1.1 Swapping [I/a] and [II/a]


There are two implicit propositions in (2): C and D. Here, too, proposition D represents a possible but not realized action in this utterance; proposition D is a conclusion implicit in B: *it could not be expected that he would help*.

Note concerning schemata [I/a] and [II/b]

If we consider proposition A as an antecedent, a cause, then proposition C is a consequence, a reason; proposition B – as the second part of an adversative relation – is, again, a consequence, a reason. Swapping Schema [I/a], we get [I/b]:




[I/b]



Schema [II/b] is more than Schema [I/b] by proposition **D**. Here, proposition **D** is an antecedent, a cause of proposition **B**.

[II/b]



**3.1.2** The order of the two constituents and the *de* [but] and *bár* [although] types of contrast yield the following four theoretical combinations. (Legend. *p* and *q* are two immediate constituents of the implication: if *p*, then *q*. 'pr' is used to denote pragmatic presupposition based on general knowledge.)

- |     |       |     |        |
|-----|-------|-----|--------|
| (1) | [I/a] | (2) | [II/a] |
|     | [I/b] |     | [II/b] |

**ad (1) [I/a]**

(A<sub>pr</sub>\*) KNOWLEDGE general

If someone does not understand something,  
then he – usually – cannot be expected  
to provide help.

ET

(A<sub>p</sub>) FACT unique

**My brother did not see why,**

I, a girl, learned like a boy.

therefore\*

(A<sub>q</sub>\*) EXPECTATION unique

(My brother) would not help  
me.

(B<sub>q</sub>) FACT unique

**he did help me.**

**ad (1) [I/b]**

(A<sub>pr</sub>\*) KNOWLEDGE general  
If someone helps somebody  
in something, then he – generally –  
can be thought of as understanding that.

ET

(A<sub>p</sub>) FACT unique

**My brother helped me,**  
therefore\*

(A<sub>q</sub>\*) PRESUMPTION unique  
(My brother) understands why I  
I learned like a boy.

(B<sub>q</sub>) FACT unique  
**but did not see why**  
I learned like a boy.

**ad (2) [II/a]**

(B<sub>pr</sub>\*) KNOWLEDGE general  
When someone does not understand some-  
thing then he is – usually not expected to help.

ET

(B<sub>p</sub>) FACT unique

**although** (my brother) **did not see why** ...  
therefore\*

(A<sub>q</sub>) FACT unique  
**My brother helped me**

(B<sub>q</sub>\*) EXPECTATION unique  
(my brother) will not help.

**ad (2) [II/b]**

(B<sub>pr</sub>\*) KNOWLEDGE general  
When someone helps another one in some-  
thing then it can be presumed – usually – that  
he understands it.

ET

(B<sub>p</sub>) FACT unique

**although** (my brother) **helped me,**  
therefore\*

(A<sub>q</sub>) FACT unique  
**My brother did not**  
**understand** why I learned  
like a boy.

(B<sub>q</sub>\*) PRESUMPTION unique  
(my brother) understands nevertheless  
why I learn  
like a boy.

### 3.2 An empirical analysis of restriction and concession

The idea of theoretical arrangement presented under the above section can be further elaborated on the basis of an excerpt from Attila József.

- (3) "...*akadt*  
*nő, ki érti e szavakat,*  
*de mégis ellökött magától.*"  
(József Attila: Nagyon fáj)

- (3) "... *a woman*  
*has been found who understands these words*  
*but rejected me nevertheless.*"  
(Attila József: It hurts so much)

#### 3.2.1 Theoretical arrangement

The arrangement possibilities related to the two phrases in bold are identical to those of (1) and (2).

- [I/a] who understands these words but rejected me nevertheless  
[I/b] who rejected me but understands these words nevertheless  
[II/a] who understands these words although she rejected me  
[II/b] who rejected me although she understands these words

#### 3.2.2 Variants that can and variants that cannot be integrated in the line of thought of the poem

3.2.2.1 Only two, [I/a] and [II/a], of the four theoretical variants can be embedded in the line of thought of the poem: the one with the original arrangement and its concessive variant. This comes as no surprise since they share one and the same 'pragmatic presupposition':

'If I find a woman who understands these words, then she will not reject me.'

[I/a]  
(Ap) FACT unique  
**a woman has been found**  
**who understands these words**

(Aq\*) HOPE unique  
this woman will not  
reject me

(Bq) FACT unique  
**but she rejected me nevertheless**

[II/a]

(Bp) PRESUMPTION unique.

**although she understands  
these words**

since/therefore\*

(Aq) FACT unique  
**rejected me**

(Bq\*) EXPECTATION unique  
she should not have rejected me

### 3.2.3 Empirical analysis

Variants under [I/b] and [II/b] cannot be embedded in the line of thought of the poem. The reason for this lies in the fact that they have different 'pragmatic presuppositions':

'If a woman understands these words yet she rejects me, then either she does not understand these words anyway, or her relation to me does not depend on whether she understands those words, or not.'

[I/b]

(Ap) FACT unique  
**who rejected me,**

(Aq\*) PRESUMPTION unique  
does not understand these  
words

(Bq) CANCELLATION OF  
EXPECTATION unique  
**but she understands these  
words nevertheless**

[II/b]


(Bp) FACT unique  
**although she rejected me**

(Aq) FACT unique  
**who understands these words,**


(Bq) EXPECTATION unique  
she was not expected to have  
been able to understand them

On the basis of empirical analysis, the two theoretical schemata of Elizabeth Rudolph used to express the essence of the *de*-[but]-type and the *bár*-[although]-type of interpretation can be simplified as follows. [The dotted line and the asterisk (\*) indicate the implicit, linguistically not expressed character of the relation or component.]

*de*-[but]-type interpretation: ((Ap) *de* [but] (Bq))



A *bár*-[although]-type interpretation: ((Aq) *bár* [although] (Bp))  
**bár** -[although] (Bp)



**3.2.4** In addition to the actual lesson learned from the above analyses, one can also formulate a methodological conclusion. As we could see, the theoretical and the empirical methods of research are mutually dependent. In confirming the line of thought contained in the excerpt from Attila József's poem, we resorted to a notional structure arranged in a paradigm. Lack of uniformity in the four-element paradigm (which manifests itself in its division into two pairs) was revealed, on the other hand, with the help of the line of thought present in spoken text.

### 3.3 Embedded contrast

The first sentence of Franz Kafka's famous novel (*Der Prozeß*) goes like this: "*Jemand mußte Josef K. verleumdet haben, denn ohne daß er etwas Böses getan hatte, wurde er eines Morgens verhaftet.*" (Somebody must have accused Josef K., because although he hadn't done anything wrong, he was arrested one morning.)

The main relation of the notional structure is represented by *because*. The proposition contained in the precedent is explained in the succedent. The role of explanation is fulfilled by a concessive structure. We can demonstrate this in two steps.

As a first step, we eliminate the concessive structure and identify its place in the contrastive paradigm consisting of four components. Then we specify which (which two) of the four components allow for embedding in the precedent or succedent of the cause-and-reason relation.


### 3.3.1 Theoretical description of the concessive and restrictive relations as notional structures

- (1.1) Josef K. was arrested one morning *but* he hadn't done anything wrong.
- (2.2) Josef K. hadn't done anything wrong *although* he was arrested one morning.
- (1.2) Josef K. was arrested one morning *although* he hadn't done anything wrong.
- (2.1) Josef K. hadn't done anything wrong *but* he was arrested one morning.

The above four theoretical meaning structures can be presented in the diagrams below as follows:


(1.1) ((Ap) *but* (Bq))

Josef K. was arrested one morning *but* he hadn't done anything wrong




(2.2) ((Aq) *although* (Bp))

Josef K. hadn't done anything wrong *although* he was arrested one morning.




(1.2) ((Aq) *although* (Bp))

Josef K. was arrested one morning, *although* he hadn't done anything wrong.




(2.1) ((Ap) *but* (Bq))

Josef K. hadn't done anything wrong *but* they arrested him one morning.





### 3.3.2 Theoretical description of the cause-and-effect relation as a notional structure




### 3.3 Theoretical description of the novel-initial global sentence as a complex notional structure

In the case below, component (2.1) of the contrastive paradigm is embedded in the *because*-relation (as its succedent). Then, the precedent of the contrastive structure plays a concessive role (*because although*). The precedent of the contrastive relation acquires a concessive function through repeating (thereby, admitting) the unique condition of the precedent:


(Ap) *Josef K. hasn't done anything wrong.*

(Bp) *Although Josef K. hasn't done anything wrong.*

### 3.3.3.1 *Somebody must have accused Josef K., because although*




*he hadn't done anything wrong, he was arrested one morning.*




In figure (3.3.2), component (1.2) of the contrastive paradigm is embedded in the *thus*-relation (as its precedent).

### 3.3.3.2 One morning Josef K. was arrested, although he



*hadn't done anything wrong, therefore someone must have accused him.*



### 3.4 Summary

One may ask on the basis of the above examples taken from pieces of literary art whether research into literature can exploit the results achieved through linguistic analysis of textual meaning. To the extent linguistic analysis can provide clear interpretations, the answer should be yes. Providing that the first clause of Kafka's sentence is in fact a 'unique implicatum', the function at hand cannot allow for some "specific" conclusion (derived from its notional structure). Hence, instead of attaching no importance to whether *Josef K. was accused or he nevertheless did commit something*, we do not even ask such a question. The reader is made aware of the absurdity of the story of Josef K. through the very first sentence – the first notional structure of the first sentence – itself.

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